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Abstract 
Little attention is given to Richard Rorty’s metaethical views. No doubt this stems 
from the fact that most commentators are more interested in his metaphilosophical 
views; most see his metaethical views, offered in scattered passages, as just the 
downstream runoff from higher-level reflection. This article considers Rorty’s 
metaethics on their own merits, quite apart from whether his global picture works. I 
ultimately argue that Rorty’s metaethical outlook is attractive but beset by internal 
difficulties. Specifically, I contend that Rorty does not and cannot remain faithful to 
the methodological approach to metaethics for which he advocates. At the paper’s 
close, I gesture at a nearby methodological approach that best approximates Rorty’s 
metaethical methodology. 
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Too little attention is paid to Richard Rorty’s metaethical views, besides the 
passing (and unclear) claim that he was some type of moral relativist. This 
inattention probably stems from the fact that Rorty’s metaethical musings 
are scattered across his oeuvre; there is no go-to place for reading and 
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engaging with Rorty’s metaethical outlook. To see his outlook requires one to 
sift through many passages in different articles and books, extrapolating and 
re-wording as needed. The effort is handsomely repaid, however, for what 
results is an interesting and plausible metaethical outlook. The primary task 
of this paper to shed light on Rorty’s metaethical outlook. The second task is 
to offer a suggestion about how the outlook might be improved. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, I outline the two parts of 
Rorty’s metaethical outlook, his substantive metaethics and his metaethical 
methodology. Then, in Section 2, I show that Rorty betrays his methodology, 
such that he has a ‘mixed’ view like Putnam and Scanlon. I call it mixed 
because it is Rortyan in one respect but not Rortyan in another. Next, in 
Section 3, I explain that Rorty had to betray his official methodology because 
there is no logical alternative. Finally, Section 4 contains a brief sketch of an 
argument that better approximates Rorty’s official methodology. 
1  Rorty’s Metaethical Outlook 
Metaethics, as most philosophers understand the field today, refers to a 
particular set of issues surrounding moral semantics, moral epistemology, 
and the metaphysics of morality. As such, three major questions dominate 
the field: the cognitivity question, the skepticism question, and the 
ontological question. I gloss these three questions as follows: 
The cognitivity question: Is moral discourse truth-apt? 
The skepticism question: Do we have moral knowledge? 
The ontological question: Are there normative properties? 
Many sophisticated metaethical positions can be summarized by their 
answers to this set of questions. Moral realists say “Yes, yes, yes” to the three 
questions. Moral constructivists also say “Yes, yes, yes.” (It is no accident that 
this view looks, in summary, indistinguishable from moral realism.) Moral 
error theorists say “Yes, no, no,” while moral expressivists say “No, no, no.” 
These three questions and the various views that can be crafted by 
combining answers to them – all of this is what I call substantive metaethics. 
There is another side to metaethics, what I call metaethical methodology. 
Metaethical methodology asks how we should settle on answers in 
substantive metaethics. More precisely, metaethical methodology is the 
domain of inquiry wherein one decides which considerations are relevant for 
answering our questions in substantive metaethics. For the sake of clarity, we 
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should have an example of a debate in metaethical methodology. With his 
2011 book,1 David Enoch spawned a debate about whether deliberative 
indispensability2 counts as good grounds for taking up a particular 
metanormative view.3 Were this debate solely about metaethics and not 
about metanormativity more generally, it would serve as a perfect example of 
a conversation in metaethical methodology. Still, it should be illustrative. 
This kind of methodological inquiry receives less fanfare than the questions 
from substantive metaethics, but it is no less important. This is especially so 
when it comes to deciphering Rorty’s views. 
Substantive metaethics and metaethical methodology are the two 
components of what I call one’s metaethical outlook. Rorty’s metaethical 
outlook – at least on the official story – is interesting and well-constructed. 
As I explain in more detail below, Rorty’s substantive metaethics is an 
increasingly common view, but his metaethical methodology is unique and 
uniquely well-suited for his substantive metaethics. 
Rorty’s substantive metaethics is an instance of what one might call 
metaethical minimalism. Perhaps the best way to delineate this view is to see 
how it answers the aforementioned big questions in substantive metaethics. 
Recall that these were the cognitivity question, the skepticism question, and 
the ontological question. The minimalist answers these questions with a yes 
to the first, a yes to the second, and hemming and hawing about the third. In 
like fashion, Rorty can assent to the idea that moral discourse is truth-apt, so 
long as we understand that claiming that a proposition is true is not to say 
anything about correspondence, or “getting reality right.”4 Saying that a 
moral statement, or any statement, is true is just to express 
“commendation,”5 Rorty says. On the skepticism question, Rorty can agree 
 
1 David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
2 Deliberative indispensability is the notion that commitment to some proposition is 
indispensable for engaging in deliberation. 
3 For just a sampling of this lively debate, see Alex Worsnip, “Explanatory Indispensability and 
Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch’s Analogy,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 
(2016), accessed November 26, 2016, doi:10.1002/tht3.220. 
4 Richard Rorty, “Introduction,” Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 1. 
5 Richard Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 23. 
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that we have moral knowledge. Since “there is no epistemological difference 
between truth about what ought to be and truth about what is,”6 there seems 
to be no good reason to deny that we have moral knowledge. Nobody 
seriously denies that we have some knowledge of the natural world; 
therefore, we have knowledge about moral matters too. On the ontological 
question, whether there are normative properties, Rorty’s response becomes 
more complicated. He wants to say that there seems to be no good reason to 
talk that way, especially if one has metaphysically inflationary designs. Moral 
discourse works just fine without recourse to normative properties. However, 
taking this stance is not to agree with someone like J.L. Mackie who argued 
against the existence of normative properties.7 As Rorty says, pragmatists “do 
not invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which 
says that ‘there is no such thing’ as… Goodness.”8 
While the primary aim is to delineate, not to defend, Rorty’s metaethics, it 
is worth pausing to note what is attractive about his substantive metaethics. 
The minimalist view has the benefit of letting us say commonsensical things 
about morality. For instance, we can say torturing animals for sport is 
morally wrong, we can further say it is true that such torture is wrong, and we 
can finally say that we know that this is wrong. This benefit is shared by other 
views, most importantly, moral realism. The added benefit of minimalism is 
that the minimalist is not saddled with an implausible metaphysics that 
seems to defy commonsense. The minimalist just avoids talk of normative 
properties, which, of course, is the lynchpin of moral realism. This is all to say 
that minimalism has all the attractions of moral realism without its major 
shortcoming. 
Let us move on from this minor digression to examining the other 
component of Rorty’s metaethical outlook, the methodology. On the official 
story, Rorty’s metaethical methodology demands that we answer our 
substantive metaethical questions in a way that does “not require either a 
metaphysics or an epistemology.”9 What does this mean? This phrase is 
shorthand for the idea that inquiry about whether p shall not be settled by 
investigating the referents and properties named in the sentence “p.” 
 
6 Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism,” Consequences of Pragmatism 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982), p. 163. 
7 J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), pp. 36–42. 
8 Richard Rorty, “Introduction,” Consequences of Pragmatism [hereinafter CP] (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1982), p. xiv. 
9 Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,”p. 22. 
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Another way to put the idea: we shall not conduct inquiry about whether p as 
if there were some realm of facts to which we can point. This claim about 
method should sound reminiscent of Rorty’s substantive metaethics. There, 
the thought was that we can settle ethical questions without recourse to 
normative properties, to correspondence-talk, to truth-makers. One does not 
argue that the ‘property of moral wrongness’ is instantiated in such-and-so 
action, according to Rorty’s minimalism. The argument purporting that such-
and-so action is wrong must be practical, not metaphysical. As Rorty puts it, 
“The pragmatists’ justification of toleration, free inquiry, and the quest for 
undistorted communication can only take the form of a comparison between 
societies… by reference to various detailed practical advantages.”10 This type 
of stance is the heart of philosophical pragmatism, for it insists that practical 
considerations, not just representational or descriptive considerations, bear 
on what we ought to say in response to philosophical and other inquiries. 
Because Rorty aims to have a view that is pragmatist all the way down, it 
should be no surprise that the relation between Rorty’s substantive 
metaethics and his ethics is parallel to the relation between his metaethical 
methodology and his substantive metaethics. In each case, the higher 
domain explains how inquiry should be conducted for the lower domain. 
And in each case, the higher domain claims that practical argument, not 
metaphysical argument, will determine the answers to the inquiries in the 
lower domain. It is well-known that Rorty argues for practical argument to 
tell us what to do ethically, but he also thinks that practical argument will 
settle other disputes, including metaethical ones. In talking about his 
disagreement with so-called realists, who are just non-pragmatists, Rorty 
says, “[the pragmatist] thinks that his views are better than the realists’, but 
he does not think that his view corresponds to the nature of things.”11 In a 
second passage, Rorty commends Nietzsche (or at least his version of 
Nietzsche) because Nietzsche “thought that realism was to be condemned 
not only by arguments from its theoretical incoherence, the sort of argument 
we find in Putnam and Davidson, but also on practical, pragmatic grounds.”12 
In a third passage, Rorty says that one should adopt his minimalism “on 
practical grounds. [This minimalism] is not put forward as a corollary of a 
 
10 Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” p. 29 (my emphasis). 
11 Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” p. 23. 
12 Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” p. 32. 
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metaphysical claim that objects in the world contain no intrinsically action-
guiding properties, nor of an epistemological claim that we lack a faculty of 
moral sense, nor of a semantical claim that truth is reducible to 
justification.”13 Here we have three passages exhibiting Rorty’s claim that 
substantive metaethical claims are to be justified practically, not on the basis 
of metaphysical argument. 
2  Rorty’s Bedfellows? 
In the previous section, I provided an overview of Rorty’s metaethical 
outlook, both the substantive metaethics and the metaethical methodology. 
In this section, I discuss a few scholars who have adopted a ‘mixed’ view, 
mixed in that they agree with Rorty in subscribing to a minimalist 
substantive metaethics but they reject his methodology. These scholars 
include Hilary Putnam,14 T.M. Scanlon,15 and indeed, Rorty himself.16 I begin 
this section by showcasing Putnam’s ‘mixed’ metaethical outlook. He defends 
Rorty-style minimalism but does so by employing a pro-metaphysics/pro-
epistemology methodology. Next, I show that Scanlon does the same. Finally, 
I demonstrate that Rorty, contrary to his own assertions, does the same. 
First, I turn to Putnam. One can see that Putnam defends minimalism by 
noting how he responds to the three central questions in substantive 
metaethics. Recall that the minimalist responds to the three questions by 
saying, “Yes, yes, well…” On the cognitivity question, Putnam says that 
“ethical claims… are bona fide instances of assertoric discourse, forms of 
reflection that are as fully governed by norms of truth and validity as any 
other form of cognitive activity.”17 On the skepticism question, Putnam agrees 
that we can have moral knowledge, and he offers arguments against those 
who would deny that by citing widespread moral disagreement as evidence 
for their skepticism.18 On the ontological question, Putnam, staying true to 
 
13 Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” p. 33. 
14 Hilary Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
15 T.M. Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
16 I should note that Ronald Dworkin defends a similar view as well. See Ronald Dworkin, 
“Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996). For 
considerations of space, I do not discuss Dworkin. 
17 Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology, pp. 74–75. 
18 Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology, pp. 30, 75–78. 
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minimalism, say something waffling. On the one hand, Putnam says that 
accounting for ethical truths by “positing non-natural objects… is to offer a 
pseudo-explanation.”19 (And Putnam doesn’t even mention philosophers like 
Peter Railton,20 Nicolas Sturgeon,21 and Richard Boyd,22 who claim that ethical 
facts are identical to natural objects and events; the implicature: that view is 
so wrong one need not to consider it.) On the other hand, Putnam sees his 
task as dismantling what he calls “eliminationist” ontological strategies like 
that of J.L. Mackie.23 
How does Putnam arrive at this view? What is his metaethical 
methodology? He relies on highly contentious metaphysical and 
epistemological claims. First, Putnam argues that the truth of ontological 
relativism makes the entire practice of accounting for what there is, 
including the practice of talking about what normative things there are, 
faulty. Later, Putnam offers a companions-in-guilt argument. He argues that 
for mathematics we can be cognitivists, non-skeptics and (more or less) deny 
that there are mathematical objects, so we should be able to say the same 
thing in ethics. To sustain his argument, Putnam has to show that 
mathematical discourse is as he claims, and supposing that he is right about 
mathematics, he needs to show why ethics is sufficiently similar to 
mathematics. Putnam’s arguments are through and through metaphysical; 
there is no Rortyan talk of “practical advantages”24 or of what would be good 
to believe. 
Having shown that Putnam adopts a mixed metaethical outlook, I turn to 
Scanlon. Like Putnam, Scanlon holds a minimalist substantive metaethics. 
He answers, “Yes, yes, well…” to the three central questions. On the 
cognitivity question, Scanlon calls his view a “realistic cognitivism about 
reasons”25 and that means his view contends that “claims about reasons for 
 
19 Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology, p. 78. 
20 Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” The Philosophical Review 95 (1986). 
21 Nicolas Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” in Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the 
Foundations of Ethics, eds. David Copp and David Zimmerman (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1985). 
22 Richard Boyd, “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
23 Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology, pp. 20–21. 
24 Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” p. 29. 
25 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, p. 2. 
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action can be correct or incorrect… [while] recognizing that there may be 
limits to the range of cases in which such claims have determinate truth 
values.”26 In other words, Scanlon agrees that some moral claims are truth-
apt. On the skepticism question, Scanlon affirms that we have moral 
knowledge: “It seems that we can discover normative truths… simply by 
thinking about these subjects in the right way.”27 On the ontological question, 
we get something more ambiguous. Scanlon admits that there are normative 
truths, but he says, “Normative truths, in my view, constitute a distinct realm 
and need no natural or special metaphysical reality in order to have the 
significance that we commonly grant them.”28 Elsewhere, Scanlon says, 
“Normative truths do not require strange metaphysical truth-makers.”29 In 
other words, Scanlon’s is another ‘ethics without ontology’ sort of view. 
Scanlon arrives at his minimalism in a peculiar way. According to Scanlon, 
there are various domains of inquiry such as the domain of the natural world, 
the domain of mathematics, and the domain of the normative. Each of these 
domains has its own standards for licensing particular claims. Ultimately, 
Scanlon is equivocal about how we should think about these standards. 
Sometimes, he talks in a metaphysically idealist way, suggesting that the 
standards come from us. For instance, in a response to a criticism from David 
Enoch, Scanlon seems to say that if we develop a discourse which licenses 
certain kinds of claims, those claims are true.30 At other times, Scanlon talks 
more as a metaphysical realist, suggesting that there are external ways of 
assessing the standards of a domain.31 Whether Scanlon is a metaphysical 
idealist, a metaphysical realist, or a confused mix of the two, what remains 
clear is that a rich metaphysical story motivates his substantive metaethics. 
 
26 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, p. 2. 
27 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, p. 70. 
28 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, p. 52. 
29 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, p. 62. 
30 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, pp. 29–30. This reply comes in considering Enoch’s 
worry that Scanlon has to admit that there could be peculiar things called counter-reasons. 
Enoch’s worry is that a community might start making claims involving counter-reasons; 
these claims would tell me people do whatever they have reason not to do. So long as there 
is a domain which licenses counter-reason claims, these claims are true, according to 
Enoch’s worry. Enoch thinks that this is implausible and a necessary consequence of 
accepting Scanlon’s minimalism. Scanlon just bites the bullet and admits that there could be 
counter-reasons. 
31 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, pp. 21–23. 
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Scanlon is a moral cognitivist because the domain of the normative licensed 
that claim, and that domain did that either because we talk that way or 
because there is some independent fact of the matter about how we should 
talk. Scanlon is non-skeptical about morality for the same reason. Scanlon’s 
waffling on the ontological question stems from a mathematics-based 
companions-in-guilt argument, similar to that of Putnam voiced ten years 
prior.32 Just like Putnam then, Scanlon employs a metaethical methodology 
that is pro-metaphysics and pro-epistemology. He relies on highly 
controversial metaphysical and epistemic principles to buttress his 
minimalist substantive metaethics. 
Despite the official story about Rorty’s methodology, his metaethical 
outlook strongly resembles that of Putnam and Scanlon. We can begin to see 
this by examining a quotation. Rorty says that the argument for his answer to 
the ontological question is that “several hundred years of effort have failed to 
make interesting sense of the notion of ‘correspondence.’”33 This is 
ambiguous as written. If Rorty really meant that he endorses a substantive 
metaethical view because an opposing view is uninteresting, that would be 
the kind of practical argument that eschews metaphysics and epistemology. 
Of course, philosophers sometimes say that views are uninteresting when 
they actually mean that the view is false, implausible, or insufficiently 
explanatory, where insufficient explanation is grounds for deeming 
something false. If Rorty meant that when he said there is no interesting 
sense of correspondence, he would be right back to the very kind of 
metaphysics that he attempts to jettison. Which is it then? 
The evidence favors the latter reading. Rorty endorses what he calls the 
“ubiquity of language” thesis, and this is the claim that we cannot compare 
our discourse to something non- discursive to check if the discourse is 
accurately tracking the non-discursive stuff.34 Given the truth of the ubiquity 
of language thesis, that is, given our epistemic inabilities, it is unhelpful to 
talk about normative properties that render our normative claims true. We 
cannot play that game, so there is no point to trying. And not playing that 
game also means not asserting in Mackie-like fashion that there are no 
normative properties. Rorty’s epistemic claim is that, for all we know there 
 
32 Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, pp. 84–87. 
33 Rorty, “Introduction,” CP, p. xvii. 
34 Rorty, “Introduction,” CP, p. xxiii. 
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are normative properties, but since we cannot check, it is epistemically 
irresponsible to adamantly deny that there are normative properties in the 
world. 
3  A Necessary Betrayal 
If it is right that Rorty’s commitment to the ubiquity of language thesis 
provides the support for his minimalism, Rorty was not practicing the 
metaethical methodology he preached. What can be said about this betrayal? 
One response is to admit that Rorty advanced arguments that were 
inconsistent with official methodology but to claim that Rorty had 
independent practical arguments that are consistent with his official 
methodology. The other response is to admit defeat, as it were, to see that 
Rorty had to break with the official methodology. In what follows, I develop 
the first response, expose its flaw, and then argue for the second response. 
It might be thought that Rorty’s ubiquity of language thesis is but the 
unfortunate residue of his early attempt to break with representationalism. 
In other words, it might be thought that Rorty was still ensnared by pro-
metaphysics, pro-epistemology theorizing when he offered the ubiquity of 
language thesis in Consequences of Pragmatism in 1982. By the time Rorty’s 
thought matured, so this line of reasoning continues, all these vestiges had 
been preened. Thus, Rorty’s methodology (for metaethics and elsewhere) is 
driven by anti-authoritarianism, a thoroughgoingly practical argument. Anti-
authoritarianism, for Rorty, is opposition to the idea that we ought to submit 
to some authority about how to live and think. In a 1999 article aptly-named 
“Pragmatism as Anti-authoritarianism,” Rorty defends this idea.35 At first 
glance, anti-authoritarianism seems like a strong, practical (as opposed to 
metaphysical) buttress for Rorty’s minimalism. We should not talk of 
normative properties as making our moral statements true because this 
would give ‘the world’ authority to tell us how to run our lives. Anti-
authoritarianism does not just make sense of the minimalist answer to the 
ontological question, it is also makes sense of minimalist answers to the 
cognitivity and skepticism questions. On the cognitivity question, the anti-
authoritarian might begin by noting that there is no good practical reason to 
 
35 Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism as Anti-authoritarianism,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
53 (1999). 
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doubt the truth-aptness of our moral discourse. When doubt arises, it arises 
in worrying that our moral statements do not correspond to something else, 
something that would license us in making moral statements. Since the anti-
authoritarian opposes the thought of appealing to some licensing stuff, she 
has no reason to make the applicability of correspondence-talk the mark of 
the cognitive. On the skepticism question, the anti-authoritarian can tell a 
similar story. Moral skepticism seems attractive when one thinks that non-
skepticism requires us to make epistemic contact with strange objects – the 
truthmakers of moral judgments – which seems dubious. However, if one 
jettisons the idea of moral truthmakers because one dislikes the 
authoritarian implications of such things, a key reason for skepticism is 
undercut. 
Despite appearances, anti-authoritarianism is not a viable escape route for 
Rorty for two reasons. The first is purely ad hominem. Even in “Pragmatism 
as Anti-authoritarianism,” Rorty retreats to his old pro-epistemology 
methodology. He writes in one passage that “Pragmatists do not think 
inquiry can put us more in touch with non-human reality than we have 
always been, for the only sense of ‘being in touch’ they cognize is causal 
interaction (as opposed to accurate representation).”36 In other words, 
humans can casually interact with the world, but they cannot accurately 
represent it;37 for that reason, inquiry cannot be tasked with accurate 
representation. 
Thus, we see that Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism is not the claim that we 
should not defer to guides about how to live and think; rather, he tells us that 
we should not defer to necessarily inscrutable guides about how to live and 
think. 
Of course, that was just an ad hominem attack. One can amend what 
Rorty says so that anti- authoritarianism stands on its own, stripped of 
epistemic and metaphysical claims. Or so it seems. Anti-authoritarianism, 
like other complex claims about how we should live, stand in need of some 
justification. These justifications inevitably turn on what the world is like, 
 
36 Rorty, “Pragmatism as Anti-authoritarianism,” p. 16. 
37 Note that in saying this, Rorty gets into another epistemic dispute with those who have 
‘causal’ theories of justification and knowledge, such that causal interaction is the basis for 
claiming that one has accurate representations of the world. See, e.g., Alvin Goldman, “What 
Is Justified Belief?” in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1979). 
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what alternative ways of living are possible, our epistemic capacities, and the 
like. To justify anti-authoritarianism (and thereby minimalism) may not 
require a rich metaphysical story à la Scanlon; nevertheless, at least some 
metaphysical and epistemic assumptions are required. 
I do not have an unassailable argument for the claim that Rorty must 
break with the official methodology and must play the pro-metaphysics, pro-
epistemology game, but consider a thought experiment aimed at urging us in 
that direction. Suppose that someone, call him Plato, has the view that there 
are normative properties in the strongest, most ontologically-laden sense, 
that we can find these properties, and that these properties render our true 
normative statements true. Can Plato be persuaded to adopt a minimalist 
metaethics on practical grounds that assume nothing about metaphysics? 
Suppose that Plato is out searching for normative properties in whatever 
way one does that and comes across a Rortyan. Further suppose that the 
Rortyan tells Plato, “Stop that activity because it’s bad for you.” Here, it’s bad 
for you is just a stand-in for an actual practical argument. To make that 
practical argument, whatever it is, one has to have some particular views 
about what people are like and what this activity is like to sustain this claim. 
One might understand the activity as something fruitless given our epistemic 
capabilities, as Rorty himself says, and that would sustain an it’s bad for you 
argument. One might understand the activity as slavish and too yielding to 
the authority of the world, which sustains the it’s bad for you argument. 
Suppose Plato asks about the alternative to ‘authoritarian’ ethical inquiry. Is 
the alternative following one’s desires? If so, the Rortyan needs to spell out 
how this is not just another way of being slavish to the world. To do that, one 
would need to offer a picture of what desires are like and what the self is like. 
Can we imagine an it’s bad for you argument that does not rely on detailed 
views about how the world is? At the limit, the Rortyan can just say “it’s bad 
for you because it is.” That is, the Rortyan can treat the practical claim 
undergirding his minimalism as entirely brute, basic, and inexplicable. This 
would be so ad hoc as not to merit being called a methodological argument 
at all. Leaving the limit-case alone, there is no logical alternative to relying on 
metaphysics and epistemology to buttress one’s substantive metaethics. 
4  More Rortyan than Rorty 
In this final component of the paper, I offer an argument for Rorty’s 
minimalism. This argument is supposed to instance a metaethical 
methodology more in line with Rorty’s official methodology. Though 
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metaphysical and epistemic commitments are inevitable, as I argued above, 
one need not to have extremely controversial commitments like those of 
Putnam, Scanlon, or indeed, Rorty himself. One might be a bit more 
ecumenical. Thus, I attempt to offer an argument that is practical, as Rorty 
suggests, but not purely practical, which would be basically impossible. The 
practical argument, though, is consistent with lots of ways the world might 
be. 
Now, one might ask why a Rortyan should prefer an ultimately ecumenical 
basis for one’s substantive metaethics. A full explanation cannot be offered 
here because a full explanation would require us to explain why Rorty’s 
official metaethical methodology is an attractive one, and for reasons of 
space, that cannot be done here. However, if one grants that it would be good 
to jettison metaphysics and epistemology altogether and to argue for one’s 
substantive metaethics on the basis of practical argument alone, one should 
be happy with the next best option, if that is unavailable. The ecumenical 
approach is the next best option. The ecumenical approach is a method of 
arguing for one’s substantive metaethics that is practical but not purely 
practical, for the practical argument relies on an underlying metaphysics and 
epistemology, but an ecumenical metaphysics and epistemology. When one’s 
practical argument relies on an ecumenical metaphysics and epistemology, 
one can show that if the world is best described in ways a, b, or c, there is still 
practical reason to hold a particular substantive metaethics. Now, this 
approximates not doing metaphysics and epistemology at all insofar as one 
need not engage in lots of metaphysical and epistemic argumentation in an 
effort to establish a unique view of the world, which is the only one 
consistent with one’s practical argument. So much for justifying my 
ecumenical approach; now I turn to giving it.38 
Suppose there was a being, Delphi, who claimed to be omniscient. At first, 
those who encounter Delphi are doubtful about its claim to know everything, 
but after Delphi reveal personal information about the skeptics, they waver 
in their doubt. By the time Delphi is offering scientific insights that enable 
medical technologies, deep space travel, and other time-saving innovations, 
everybody is a true believer. Delphi’s first pronouncements about ethics are 
perfectly normal. Delphi says that we ought to share resources with other 
 
38 The following thought experiment comes from my unpublished paper, “Ethical 
Pragmatism.” 
14 DONELSON 
CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM 14 (2017) 1-16 
humans, that sex-based discrimination in employment is wrongful, that legal 
punishment should aim at rehabilitating the offender. But later, Delphi 
makes some strange moral judgments. Delphi says that it is moral 
requirement to kill one’s first-born child and that enslaving other human 
beings is morally permissible. People who hear this have to decide what to 
make of these claims. The wisest choice, or at least the choice upon which 
most people settle, is believing that Delphi has described the ethical facts 
while denying that these facts should guide behavior. No one, then, is moved 
to act in accord with the distasteful principles Delphi announced. 
What, if anything, does the Delphi hypothetical tell us about substantive 
metaethics? The hypothetical offers support for a kind of anti-
authoritarianism, for it reveals a problem with blindly following an authority, 
namely that the authority might prescribe a way of life that we cannot 
endorse upon reflection. Given this practical problem with authorities, we 
might decide that talking about the truthmakers for moral claims is a bad 
idea; consequently, we might say that we do not need them. At the same 
time, one might worry that affirming moral error theory suggests another 
infatuation with authority, a kind of “If there is no God, all is permitted” 
thought. This practical problem with authority might lead us to distance 
ourselves from that view. Thus, we get to the minimalist answer to the 
ontological question. From here, it should prove easy to reach minimalist 
answers to the cognitivity and skepticism questions.39 Admittedly, for all I 
have said so far, one might draw different, non-minimalist inferences upon 
reading the hypothetical. The point here is not to convince anyone that the 
Delphi hypothetical uniquely supports minimalism but rather to indicate 
how it could be used for minimalism. 
The Delphi hypothetical is the kind of ecumenical approach that is the 
next best option for someone committed to Rorty’s official metaethical 
methodology. The hypothetical does support a kind of anti-authoritarianism, 
but it is quite specific. The hypothetical casts aspersions on the idea that 
there is a realm of moral facts which should serve as guides on how to live; it 
does not involve more general opposition to deference to the ‘authority of 
the world.’ A more general anti-authoritarianism of that kind would raise 
hard metaphysical questions about how relying on our beliefs and desires is 
not just a special case of deferring to the authority of the world. To 
understand the problem that the people in the Delphi world face does not 
 
39 One could rely on the argumentative strategy sketched above in Section 3. 
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require too many specific metaphysical or epistemic assumptions; in fact, 
there are lots of ways the world could be that are consistent with the 
possibility of Delphi and the problem it presents. Thus, to raise the Delphi 
hypothetical and to use it to support a minimalist substantive metaethics 
does not require engaging in much metaphysical or epistemic argument, 
which best approximates Rorty’s ideal of jettisoning metaphysical or 
epistemic argument whole cloth. Of course, the Delphi hypothetical does 
carry some assumptions. For instance, the hypothetical turns on the ability to 
judge that p states a moral obligation and judge that conforming to p would 
be repugnant. Some philosophers think that one cannot have judgments like 
that.40 Even in making this assumption, the advocate of the Delphi 
hypothetical is quite ecumenical. It is much tougher to show that some 
event, which is not logically impossible, is metaphysically impossible than it 
is to assume that the event is possible while perhaps unlikely. Even if one is 
doubtful on that score, it remains true that relying on the Delphi 
hypothetical to motivate a limited anti-authoritarianism is a less pro-
metaphysics, pro-epistemology methodology than Rorty’s own ubiquity of 
language thesis. In short, this strategy is more Rortyan than Rorty himself. 
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